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Abstract 
Although schools’ relative contribution to pupils’ progress is increasingly used in accountability 
systems around the world (OECD, 2013), momentum for value-added models (VAM) has not 
been reached in Chile. This small-scale study explores qualitatively the policy context in which 
this omission takes place, by analyzing policy documents and interviewing local policymakers 
and researchers about their views on VAM. These agents and official documents not only point 
to political, methodological and pragmatic reasons for and against value-added indicators, but 
also highlighted ethical and legal reasons pro (but not against) VAM. Overall, the most 
prominent reason for including VAM into the new accountability system was the ethical 
consideration. The notion that a fairer indicator could make justice, especially for those schools 
working in disadvantaged contexts, was a recurrent idea. In contrast, the most recurrent reasons 
against VAM were methodological. Whilst research on VAM for the Chilean school system has 
been conducted over the last decade, it has impacted very little the policy arena. Given that the 
creation of frameworks for assessing value-added indicators takes time, needs policy and 
research support and needs to consider potential unintended consequences, the road towards 
including them into the Chilean school accountability system is just starting. 
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Searching for fairer ways of assessing school effectiveness 
Despite extensive literature over 25+ years addressing this topic there remains an ongoing 
international debate on how to best assess the contribution that schools make to pupils’ learning.  
Notably few researchers claim that raw-score results (or unadjusted tests) are the best way for 
assessing school effectiveness because it matters very little which school a child goes to (Gorard, 
2006, 2008, 2010). Contrary to Gorard’s claim, educational effectiveness research conducted in 
different contexts has shown that schools have indeed a critical effect upon children’s academic 
 
 
achievement and progress, demonstrated by statistically significant differences between schools 
in relation to pupils’ value added progress. Whilst raw measures of pupils’ academic outcomes 
are useful for highlighting the attainment gaps at the school system, it is typically considered a 
poor indicator for other purposes -such as school accountability, school improvement or school 
choice- because making the school solely responsible for the results of their students, without 
accounting for external factors, is not fair, nor defendable (Muñoz-Chereau & Thomas, 2016).  
 
Taking a cross-sectional approach at one time point, contextualized attainment models control 
for student-level socio-economic and demographic factors without a longitudinal dimension that 
accounts for measures of prior attainment.  Using this alternative approach, research has shown 
that measures produced by these models, although better than raw attainment scores, do not 
remove satisfactorily the effects of previous attainment background characteristics, especially in 
unequal school systems (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz & Hamilton, 2004). As reported by 
Sammons, Thomas, Mortimore, Owen and Pennell (1993) as well as Thomas and Mortimore 
(1996), when prior attainment is absent, socioeconomic factors provide an imperfect proxy to 
explain a substantial proportion of the variation in student outcomes. Thus the lack of individual 
prior attainment results in substantial increases in the apparent impact of some of the control 
variables, such as parental education. Also, in the absence of prior attainment, the overall 
goodness of fit of the models tends to be low. For example Sammons et al. (1993) reported a 
goodness of fit in terms of only 13.3% of the total variance explained, after controlling for 
student-level characteristics/background and school-level context variables simultaneously when 
analyzing a sample of schools’ GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) performance 
in England, whereas models including prior attainment typically explain up to 50% of total 
variance (Thomas & Mortimore, 1996). 
 
Also approaches such as regression-discontinuity designs (RDD) widely used to analyse the 
intervention of other specific programmes using Chilean administrative data, appears not feasible 
to assess yearly school performance. A reason for this was provided by Urquiola and Verhoogen 
(2009) when evaluating the effect of class size on student academic outcomes. These authors 
 
reported that a key assumption of RDD –that schools cannot manipulate their treatment status- 
was violated, as Chilean schools implemented strategic behaviours (e.g increasing fees as a way 
of reducing enrolments) instead of opening new classrooms to tackle oversubscription whilst 
keeping class size constant. Therefore RDD internal validity can be compromised when 
implemented in Chilean context.  
 
The position that researchers and policymakers take within the debate concerning the best 
approaches to evaluate school effectiveness is crucial, especially in countries with a high-stake 
test-based accountability system such as England and Chile, where certain school communities, 
headteachers and teachers are rewarded, ignored or penalized on the basis of how effective they 
appear to be. Therefore this paper explores school value added models (VAM) which estimate 
the relative contribution that schools make to their students’ educational progress towards 
prescribed education objectives, whilst controlling for the contribution of other factors outside 
the control of the school that help explaining that progress (OECD 2008). Although the 
international literature has yet to reach consensus regarding the value of VAM, the fact that raw 
and contextualised measures routinely used in the Chilean accountability system are highly 
correlated with students’ SES, makes it difficult to identify high value-added schools (McEwan, 
Urquiola, Vegas, Fernandes and Gallego, 2008).  Although VAM are far from being a panacea, 
and have not developed without controversy, they have been conceived as a more accurate tool 
than raw results for identifying good practice in the educational system (OECD, 2008).  In the 
Chilean context, local researchers have recognised VAM as a sound methodological alternative 
for analysing the educational impact of market-driven mechanisms in education (Carrasco and 
San Martín, 2012), and critically evaluating the effectiveness of the school system, different 
educational policies, and the new accountability system in place (Page, San Martín, Orellana and 
González, 2016). Consequently, the advantages and shortcomings of VAM identified in the 
literature will be explored in the next section. 
 
VAM strengths 
Accuracy: Comparing like with like  
Due to the fact that pupils and teachers are not distributed randomly in most school settings, 
individual student characteristics (also called "the intake") are considered to be potentially 
 
 
confounded with those associated with classes or school groups (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). 
This has proved especially true in the Chilean educational system (Manzi, San Martín and Van 
Bellegem 2011; Meckes and Bascopé, 2012; Torres, 2018). The accuracy argument has been 
presented as follows: "natural justice demands that schools are held accountable only for those 
things they can influence (for good or ill) and not for all the existing differences between their 
intakes" (Nuttall, 1990, p.25). The principle applied here is that "like should be compared with 
like" (Gray and Wilcox, 1995, p.89). The OECD (2008) also highlighted that VA is a technique 
designed to make fair comparisons between schools by giving a more accurate measurement of 
their performance: "It yields estimates of average progress for each institution. To assess the 
"value" added by the school, it is essential to adjust for various background factors and for prior 
attainment by the individual child. To assess effectiveness of different schools without taking 
such information into account is like comparing apples with oranges. Unless schools are 
compared on a like with like basis, judgements are neither fair nor valid" (Stoll and Mortimore, 
1997, p.10; Ballou, Sanders and Wright, 2004).  
 
VAM have been presented as an alternative and valid tool for making comparisons in school 
performance. After testing out different ways of considering students’ differences in SES and 
their prior cognitive capacity, "the adoption of value added methodology enables the calculation 
of more reliable estimates of school relative effectiveness (residuals) in promoting students’ 
outcomes. Studies emphasize the importance of obtaining individual student level information 
about personal, family and socioeconomic background and, of crucial importance, about prior 
attainment, in the analysis of school effects on cognitive achievements" (Sammons, 1999, p.56).  
 
Even though there is a general agreement around this principle of the need of comparing like 
with like, authors are still inconclusive on how to implement it. What factors are "exogenous" or 
outside school control? Or, to put it differently, what should schools be held accountable for? 
The overarching rationale behind VAM is that it is possible to adjust those factors outside the 
control of the school that can be identified as partially responsible for school differences. This 
claim, which lies at the heart of this field, is rarely questioned. But being aware that "education is 
jointly produced by teachers, schools, families, and communities" (Hanushek, 1997; Harris, 
2009, in Rosenkvist, 2010, p. 27), the idea is that "the use of such models is intended to emulate 
 
(to the greatest extent possible) the situation of a randomised experiment" (OECD, 2008, p.156). 
As defined by the influential work of Raudenbush and Willms (1995), “school effect” may be the 
extent to which attending a particular school modifies a student’s outcome" (p. 308). So, in order 
to tackle the problem of non-random assignment of students to schools, VAM adjust for pre-
existing differences among students and schools.   
 
Sophistication  
VAM are sophisticated when compared with earlier assessment models within School 
Effectiveness Research (SER) using different approaches (Thomas, Peng  and Gray, 2007; 
Braun, Chudowsky and Koening, 2010), often requiring the mediation of technical aspects 
before their results are used at the school level (Saunders, 2000; Rosenkvist, 2010). Most 
sophisticated statistical techniques currently available have enabled a better understanding of the 
relative importance of the contribution of the school to student outcomes (Goldstein, 1995).  
 
Caution in interpretation: Let’s be realistic  
VAM need to be interpreted cautiously since confidence intervals for school effects indicate 
many schools cannot be reliably separated one from another in terms of their estimated 
contribution to students learning. Given that most of the schools will have overlapping 
confidence intervals, especially when single cohorts are examined, residuals cannot be used as 
rankings and only a few schools’ future performances can be separated from both the overall 
mean and from one another with an acceptable degree of precision (Leckie and Goldstein, 2009). 
However, they can be classified in three groups: underperforming, average or over-performing 
schools (Goldstein and Thomas, 1996). For this reason, studies in this area need to take note of 
the statistical uncertainty attached to estimates of individual school effects (i.e. 95% confidence 
interval). Only then can VAM be used as helpful screening instruments (Sammons, 1999). So, if 
a school is below expectations -across several criteria and over a period of years- then legitimate 
concerns can be raised about its performance. Rather than being passive or complacent, VAM 





VAM weaknesses evolve around the claims of unreliable estimations in small schools, low 
expectations, questionable utility of estimates, complexity and endogeneity. 
 
Unreliable estimations in small schools  
Even though shrunken estimates - resulting variances that are smaller than the true values 
obtained in the estimates of regression predictions- (see Goldstein, Rasbash, Yang, Woodhouse, 
Pan, Nuttall and Thomas, 1993) generate a more precise estimation when weighting the 
importance of cluster units according to their sizes, precision and stability of the estimates 
become problematic when estimating the performance of small schools with few students 
enrolled. To solve this issue, previous studies conducted in Chile have excluded from their 
samples schools with less than a certain number of students, such as 20 or 15 (Carrasco and San 
Martín, 2012), which imposes a limitation in assessing small schools, particularly rural ones.  
 
Low expectations  
One of the side effects of VAM is the strong evidence that the impact of background or 
contextual factors on value-added measures can lead to lower expectations for specific groups of 
students (Sammons, 1999). As it is metaphorically expressed by Braun et al (2010, p. 8) "Value-
added modelling can make the playing field more level, but it can also reverse the tilt". 
Timmermans. et al (2011) problematized this point by saying that "using ethnicity or gender as a 
control variable implies that we expect and allow some subgroups of students to perform less 
successfully on their final examination, regardless of their prior achievement" (p. 419).  
 
Questionable utility of estimates  
VAM will make a difference to a school’s reported performance only at the extremes of 
effectiveness and ineffectiveness (OECD, 2008). Thus it has been argued that some sectors -such 
as prospective employers- are not interested in the students’ qualifications adjusted by their 
social background, but instead on what their educational outcomes show they can do (Schagen 
and Hutchison, 2003). Therefore, it is important to compare unadjusted measures of school effect 
with VAM because even though the latter are fairer to assess school performance, they can also 
hide differences in Raw scores. VAM can only refer to the sample studied, and what is more, 
 
estimates of school performance are affected by the choice of which control/explanatory variable 
is included.  
 
Complexity  
As recognised by many authors, there is a trade-off between presenting a more easily 
communicable model and developing a model that is more statistically robust but also more 
complex (Saunders, 2000; OECD, 2008; Evans, 2009; Manzi, San Martín and Van Bellegem, 
2011). Complexity derived from the statistics on which VAM unavoidably rest represents a 
challenge for potential users when interpreting the findings. The most fundamental objections are 
concerned with what the adjustment processes do. This is especially problematic given the 
evidence that "a new system is likely to be more effective if teachers believe the measure treats 
them fairly in the sense of holding them accountable for things that are under their control" 
(Braun et al, 2010, p. 22) which, of course, needs to be understood in the first place. In this line, 
interesting work oriented to communicate VA results to schools for improvement purposes was 
conducted by the National Foundation for Educational Research (NfER) when these models 
became part of the accountability system in England (i.e. Schagen and Morrison, 1999; 
Saunders, 2000). Their work evidenced the difficulties of communicating complex information 




One major difficulty that VAM face, is the problem derived from the endogeneity of school 
inputs (i.e. economic resources) due to the non-random way in which they are allocated across 
schools, especially in the Chilean case. Given that economic resources and other omitted 
variables are already correlated with both the actual test score and the prior test score, the error 
of the model is not uncorrelated with the prior attainment score. The implication of this non-
vanishing correlation between the prior attainment score of a student and the school random 
effect is that the estimation of the school random effect will be affected by this correlation 
(Manzi, San Martín and Van Bellegem, 2011). Therefore these authors have included 




Summarizing, the three major VAM strengths are: firstly, the accuracy argument that highlights 
fairer comparisons between school performance after adjusting for factors that are out of the 
school’s control (such as background factors and prior attainment). Secondly, the VAM research 
designs, techniques and software for data analysis are more sophisticated when compared with 
earlier models within School Effectiveness Research (SER)/ Educational Effectiveness Research 
(EER) using different approaches, making clear that it is foolish to pretend that a Raw league 
table can fairly assess the quality of schools. Thirdly, VAM calls for a realistic interpretation of 
school effects because confidence intervals for VAM estimates are wide, meaning that many of 
the schools cannot be reliably separated one from another in terms of their estimated contribution 
to students' learning. The reason why this is seen as an advantage is because VAM need to be 
interpreted with a degree of caution.  
 
Despite their merits, these approaches are not free from caveats, nor do they guarantee they will 
serve all policy purposes. As Braun et al (2010) summed it up: "Each major class of models has 
shortcomings, there is no consensus on the best approaches, and little work has been done on 
synthesizing the best aspects of each approach (…) More needs to be learned about how these 
properties differ, using different value-added techniques and under different conditions" (p. 54). 
It is recognised that the main limitations mentioned above -unreliable estimations in small 
schools, low expectations for specific group of students, questionable utility for specific 
stakeholders, complexity and the problems derived from the endogeneity of schools’ inputs- 
have a strong impact on these models' merits. Moreover, in those educational systems where 
VAM has been implemented to evaluate teacher effectiveness such as the USA, weaknesses and 
unintended consequences have been argued to be stronger, as researchers have raised additional 
significant limitations such as the risks of test score inflation (Hursh, 2013; Koretz, 2017).  As 
summarised by Koretz (2017), “it’s utterly irrational to “evaluate” teachers based on scores 
earned by students of other teachers, particularly teachers in other schools or who teach other 
subjects” (p.145).  
 
The context: Chilean new accountability system 
After three decades of neoliberal reforms, the Chilean educational system stands out for the 
wrong reasons: low academic performance, high socioeconomic segregation and inequality of 
 
educational opportunities (Valenzuela, Belleï & De Los Ríos, 2014). This system has been 
singled out internationally as one where students’ socio-economic status typically results in one 
of the highest influences on students’ performance (OECD, 2010). As clearly put by Murillo & 
Román (2011), the cradle has an overwhelmingly stronger effect than the school when 
explaining Chilean pupil academic performance.  Additionally, Chile is among those countries 
such as Macao-China, Hong Kong-China, the Netherlands and Ireland, where fewer than 50% 
15-year-old students attend public schools (OECD, 2013). Because Chilean schools are also 
unequally funded, making fair and accurate comparisons between schools is very difficult. 
 
In this context, Chile has introduced new school accountability mechanisms, which are coherent 
with a performative turn in its educational system (Pitton, 2012). The “Sistema Nacional de 
Aseguramiento de la Calidad de la Educación” (National System of Education Quality 
Assurance) encompasses the creation of different bodies, such as the Quality Agency of 
Education (QAE), whose role is to monitor and assess school performance in order to make 
schools accountable for their results. Recently the QAE has used contextualized attainment 
models and other non-academic indicators of school quality (such as students’ citizenship and 
self-esteem) in order to classify schools in four performance groups: High, Medium, Low 
Medium and Insufficient. High-stakes consequences on the basis of this classification - ranging 
from organizational interventions up to school closure – are implemented for schools that do not 
meet the required standards (i.e. the 630 “insufficient” schools). 
 
 As this new classification does not use VAM to account for Chile’s extremely unequal society, 
we argue that, although moving from raw league tables to contextualized attainment models 
represents an improvement, nevertheless, the new system of school classification is unfair and 
still punishes schools located in disadvantaged areas. Not surprisingly, according to the 2017 
QAE classification, only 3.3% of schools with High and Middle-High Socioeconomic Status are 
“Insufficient”, in comparison with 31.4% of those with Low and Middle-Low Socioeconomic 
Status. By contrast, 74.8% of schools with High and Middle-High Socioeconomic Status are 
classified as “High” performing, in comparison to 18.2% of those with Low and Middle-Low 




Recent research using Chilean data has concluded that the apparent differences in school 
effectiveness reduce dramatically when using VAM. Muñoz-Chereau (2018) found that the 
percentage of total variance in student’s math Raw attainment attributable to differences between 
primary schools reduced from 28.5% to 14.5% after controlling for aspects arguably out of the 
school control, indicating that the pupil intake and contextual features of Chilean primary 
schools exert a powerful influence on students’ outcomes. Without VAM, these differences 
might be wrongly attributable to differences between schools’ effectiveness, when in reality they 
are by large due to prior attainment and socioeconomic inequalities (Manzi, San Martín & Van 
Bellegem, 2011; Muñoz-Chereau, 2013; Muñoz-Chereau & Thomas, 2016; Torres, 2018). 
Whilst in England the correlations between raw and value-added models tend to be relatively 
high, in the Chilean case these tend to be relatively low. Here lies another key reason to include 
these types of indicators into the Chilean accountability system. Crucially Muñoz-Chereau 
(2013) found a correlation of 0.31 between Math raw and contextual value-added residuals in 
secondary schools, and Carrasco and San Martín (2012) reported a similar low correlation of 
0.42 between Math raw and VAM residuals in a sample of Chilean secondary schools. This 
differs significantly with research carried in England, where Thomas & Mortimore (1996) and 
Gorard (2008) found a much higher although still imperfect association between raw and value-
added residuals: 0.73 and 0.75, in Math and English, respectively.  
 
For these reasons, without value-added indicators, the new school classification system in Chile 
will say little about the quality of the schools and much about prior attainment of their intakes, 
seriously biasing the perception of the effectiveness of Chilean schools, a point strongly 
supported by previous researchers (McEwan & Carnoy, 2000; Belleï, 2005; Schagen & 
Hutchison, 2003; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2006; Carnoy, 2007; Valenzuela, 2008; San Martín & 
Carrasco, 2012). In line with Murphy (2012), we are not arguing for value-added as the only 
indicators to be considered when implementing high-stakes decisions. Rather, and in line with 
Saunders and Rudd (1999), we advocate for the need to include these indicators among others, in 
order to construct “a truer picture of a school’s achievements, and for diagnosing pedagogical 
strengths and weaknesses within the school” (p. 9), which are the expected effects that these 
measures can bring if they were eventually included in the Chilean school accountability system.  
 
 
Although value-added indicators appear specially fit for complementing the estimation of 
Chilean schools’ effects, and different initiatives have promoted their inclusion in the new 
accountability system, these indicators are absent from the current educational landscape. Yet 
from the 2000s onwards, value-added indicators for school performance seem to be waiting for 
government ratification, as their inclusion has been repeatedly recommended in the Chilean 
context (Himmel report, 2003; LGE, 2011). 
 
Thus, this paper seeks to elucidate the policy context in which value-added indicators remain 
disregarded and address the following research question: what do Chilean policy documents and 
stakeholders report as the main advantages and barriers of using VAM to evaluate schools? 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
The research is conducted by analyzing policy documents and interviewing local policymakers 
and researchers about their views on VAM. We will explore why and how the new assessment 
system keeps reflecting only the Socioeconomic Status (SES) of the students but not their 
relative progress. The aim is to seek explanations that enable us to understand why, despite a 
favourable legal context towards the consideration of value-added indicators, their inclusion into 
the new school accountability system has been held back.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Policy Documents 
Six official policy documents that define the new national assessment system were included in 
this study. These were identified by one expert informant at the Curriculum and Assessment Unit 
(Ministry of Education), and confirmed via an independent literature search by the authors as the 
key documents emanated from government agencies that have shaped the current national 
assessment system: 




2. LGE: Creates the National Quality Assurance System for Pre-school, Primary and Secondary 
Education and its control. Official Magazine of the Republic of Chile, Santiago, August 27, 2011 
3. Recommendations for a National Curriculum Development Policy, May 2016 
4. Response NAP: Response to the Recommendations of the National Council of Education 
Regarding the National Assessment Plan 2016-2020, Ministry of Education, June 2016 
5. NAP: National Assessment Plan (2016-2020) 
6. Decree 182, that established the National and International Assessment Plan 2016-2020, 
Official Magazine of the Republic of Chile, Santiago June 20th, 2016 
 
Interviews 
Five semi-structured interviews with key policymakers (one current and one former officer from 
QAE) and researchers that have collaborated with QAE and work in different universities 
(known here as University A, B and C for anonymity reasons) were conducted in Chile during 
March and April, and October and November 2017. 
 
The aim of the analysis was to answer the research question oriented to identify the reasons 
given by policy documents, policymakers and researchers in favour and against using value-
added indicators to assess school performance. After translating from Spanish to English and 
transcribing the policy documents and interviews, we took a grounded approach to inductively 
build an interpretation based on constant comparisons. Instead of analyzing each source 
separately, we identified component themes or categories across policy documents and 
interviews (Kohler Riessman, 2008). This procedure consists in breaking down into smaller 
pieces the information and compare the pieces for similarities and differences before grouping 
them under themes or categories (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). In this way the themes or categories 
were derived from data during the analysis. By careful consideration of the data, an interpretation 
of the most common meanings was brought into the analysis. Five different types of 
justifications (legal, ethical, methodological, political and pragmatic) and component themes (i.e. 
fairness, social justice, etc.) were identified by the researchers. In this sense, the justifications 





The inclusion of VAM to measure the academic performance of Chilean schools presents 
multiple possibilities and challenges. In terms of the reasons supporting the integration of VAM 
into the new accountability system, five different types of justifications provided by policy 
documents, policy-makers and researchers were identified.  
 
Table 1: Reasons pro value-added provided by policy makers, researchers and policy 
documents 
 
Reasons Pro VAM Exemplary quote  




“In order to carry out this arrangement, the Agency shall 
consider the learning results of all the areas measured in 
the national assessments census survey, the distribution of 
the pupils' results in relation to the learning standards and 
the degree of achievement of the other indicators of 
educational quality. It shall also consider the school pupils' 
characteristics, including, among others, its vulnerability, 
and, where appropriate, progress or value-added 
indicators. Nevertheless, gradually, the arrangement of the 
schools will tend to be carried out independently of the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the pupils, to the extent 
that the system corrects the differences ascribable to those 




“The Commission considers relevant that the system 
allows to know the learning progression throughout the 
school process and not only the status in each level or 
evaluated course. In other words, record the student’s 
performance in a level or course in relation to their 
performance in the following or earlier year. To achieve 
this, it is imperative that the annual sequence of 
measurements allow the same cohort to be followed up.  
This can be achieved by ensuring that the cohort that 
participates in the measurement in 4th grade is evaluated 
in 8th grade and, desirably, also in 10th grade. It highlights 
the importance that this information may have for the 
incentive system and for the public account of schools, in 
terms of doing fairer assessments, which reflect not only 
the performance of the students, but also their progress. 
On the other hand, a modality of this type would 
contribute to discourage selection and exclusion practices 
by schools, by explicitly assessing progress with respect to 
different starting points.” (Himmel Report, 2003, p. 61) 
 
 
Social justice “When you isolate the variables, above all socioeconomic 
level, you can see that in a four year period the public 
schools, in relative terms, grow much more [...] even 
though they have lower SIMCEs, but they start much 
lower [...] whereas some types of schools, above all the 
fully private, keep a high SIMCE, but the history of their 
SIMCE is always high, so we don't know the leaps they 
have made [...] and also since there is already a lot of 
knowledge pointing out that SIMCE only explains 
socioeconomic differences, then I believe that making a 
value-added assessment would do justice to schools, could 
also improve the collective self-esteem of the schools, of 
this teacher that goes to a bad school, because everybody 
is telling him it has 190 points, but nobody looks at the 
history, the trajectory of that school [...] I think it would 
introduce a bit more justice.” (Researcher University A) 





“I think it would be very interesting to bring up the idea 
that value-added indicators could substitute other 
indicators of quality […] Thus, it would make me happy if 
the solution to that problem {lack of validity of new 
indicators} were longitudinal value-added. That you report 
status and progress, and the other indicators of quality, 





 “I think that value-added indicators yield much more 
information than values that are [...] cross-sectional 
basically, that take different cohorts, always in the same 






“I think that we'll be late, as always [...] when someone 
comes out with it, when a new minister arrives […] 
probably, if this government is elected, they will go to 
England or the United States. And will come back with the 
idea that they, in Mississippi they do this value-added 
thing...oh yes, it rings a bell, we did it last government, it 
didn't work, let's do it again, and we will be the kings of 
value-added […] with a five year delay in respect to the 
developed world.” (Former Policymaker QAE) 
Regional 
Leadership 
“In Latin America there is no other country with a working 
value-added system (In Higher Education) in Colombia, 
and I am not sure, they are like just starting [...] but none 
in school education, no other country. Thus Chile would 








“This Plan allows the estimation of some progress or 
value-added indicators, because it makes possible for some 
student cohorts to be assessed twice during their school 
life. For example, in some cases, we will be able to do a 
follow-up between year four and six, and in others, 
between year eight and year ten.” (NAP, p. 34) 
 
First of all, documents and participants mentioned (1) legal reasons, understood as claims 
referred to frameworks or documents developed by law, such as the inclusion in LGE and Decree 
182. For example “The Evaluation Plan shall allow the carrying out of studies of progress and/or 
value-added indicators, in line with the recommendation of the Committee that reviewed SIMCE 
in 2003 and as established in the law Nº 20.529.” (Decree 182, p. 12). In this way the LGE 
(2011) made explicit the need to conduct value-added studies associated with the new 
classification of schools used for the implementation of high-stakes accountability measures. (2) 
Ethical reasons grouped claims referring to principles and ideals that should be promoted in the 
educational system, such a making the school system fairer or socially just. In line with Braun et 
al (2010), who pointed out the ethical and methodological reasons that support value-added 
indicators in the U.S context, one of the strongest reasons given by policymakers and researchers 
(and also present in policy documents) was bringing fairness - understood as fair-play achieved 
through the consideration of the context in which schools are located - and social justice to the 
current school classification system. As expressed by a researcher “I think it is a good idea that 
we look for information that is more sensitive towards the context, and hence I see that value-
added should be a positive addition, even if the law had not mandated it.” (Researcher University 
C).  (3) Methodological reasons refer to considerations of the procedures, methods and issues 
that need to be conducted or resolved before generating value-added indicators, such as data, 
sample and models. Regarding methodological reasons, three interviewees perceived that value-
added models imply a new perspective, enabling the reporting of status alongside progress 
measures, and gaining a reliable indicator to disentangle the school effect. For example, “A 
value-added indicator should [...] provide a perspective and a kind of information that differs 
from what we've been traditionally looking at. So, I see it as an opportunity to enrich the 
system.” (Researcher University C). (4) Political reasons point out to government agendas and 
administration priorities. The political reasons mentioned (international policy borrowing and 
regional leadership) suggest that local policymakers and researchers are aware and subject to the 
 
 
influence of regional and international trends in educational policy. Finally, (5) Pragmatic 
reasons group practical considerations, such as the opportunity to conduct value-added studies 
because there is available data. Overall, the most prominent reason for including value-added 
indicators into the new accountability system was the ethical consideration. Given the national 
and international recognition of the unequal educational playing field present in Chile, the notion 
that a more accurate and fairer indicator could make justice, specially to those schools working 
in disadvantaged contexts, was a recurrent idea among participants and policy documents. By 
contrast, the pragmatic reason appeared as the less prominent.  
 
Regarding reasons against value-added indicators, although policy documents, policymakers and 
researchers identify more challenges than advantages associated with VAM, these can be 
grouped in only three groups of reasons: Political, Methodological and Pragmatic. In other 
words, no legal or ethical considerations against value-added were identified in this study.  
 





Exemplary quote  
Political Value-laden 
methodology 
“The right-wing wanted to close schools, it didn't matter 
which ones, and the left-wing wanted to avoid closing 
public schools. [...] That was the truth. And hence, given the 
extreme segregation [...] multilevel allowed you to estimate 
that you would be less harsh with those little public 
schools.”  (Former policymaker ACE) 
 Lack of 
political 
vision 
“Because I think that for this administration value-added 
would have been more palatable than what they have today. 
And there, well, political decisions are never taken for the 
country, always for the most immediate interest, but if the 
QAE's committee, which was pro-government in its 
majority, had decided to implement the methodology 
suggested by the opposition, that was multilevel, it is much 
more probable that they would have kept it when in office 
[...] there was a lack of political vision, of knowing that this 





“This system is much more aggressive in modelling 
improvement, thus requiring a lot of emphasis in schools' 
orientation and support. And this leads you to a certain 
logic, that is the logic of cooperation, of building networks 
of schools, so that they can improve by cooperating [...] the 
 
state cooperates and also trusts [...] this logic is very strong 
in this system of quality assurance, but it coexists with the 
logic of accountability, with the consequence of closure, 
which is like [...]a logic much more of distrust, a more 
punitive logic, more pressure, more stick than carrot [...] 
this law makes these two logics coexist [...] we have 
emphasized and invested much more in the first one, and in 
this sense value-added log behind [...] because it goes 
against the grain.” (Policymaker ACE)   
 Research 
opposition 
 “They never dare to... and there it can be helpful to 
consider the national climate [...] the last year of Piñera's 
government, when they were implementing it, was the first 
year of the QAE, there was a lot of hostility against this 
issue, [...] a strong aggressiveness within academic circles 
against this [...] the idea that this was a stupidity, badly 
done, too simplistic, and that it had been possible to 
implement only because they had the political majority in 
the QAE’s committee. [...] there was such an opposition 
towards ordinary least squares, that it was too difficult to 






 “It generates a lot of pressure in schools and goes against 
the principles of this administration, of rationalizing the 
number of tests, of widening the perspective over quality, of 
stop putting all the assessment effort on academic 
performance tests. I think that, in technical terms, there are 
thousands of reasons that support doing value-added 






"In order to do it in an adequate manner you have to ensure 
that the test can be compared between the different years, 
and in Chile SIMCE is not comparable, because it is not 
vertically equated.” (Researcher, University B); “We also 
have problems linked to the metrics of the scales, that is [...] 
the system is working at different levels, but the tests for 
each level are not connected between them or aligned, they 
have formally equivalent scales but [...]they are not 
vertically equated.” (Researcher University C) 
Debatable 
indicator 
 “Furthermore, there is some awareness, or vague 
awareness, that the concept of value-added is at least 
debatable or controversial. That it is not a sort of panacea as 




 “Those schools for which it is plausible to estimate 
progress and value-added indicators are characterized by 
particular conditions, for example, high enrolment, high 
student retention, they are predominantly fully private or 
 
 
state-subsidized private [...] they represent a biased sample 
of the schools' population, limiting the external validity of 
the estimations carried out for monitoring the educational 
system.” (NAP, 2016, p. 34) 
School size “There are many special issues that are difficult to sort out 
in Chile. One of them is the issue of the schools' size, that 
is, we have many small-sized schools. And how do we 
solve the problem of value-added when schools have too 




“(There is) evidence and debate within the academic 
community regarding the low consistency of value-added 
indicators estimated with different methodologies and 
control variables. Because of this, the results are very 
sensitive to technical decisions along the estimation 
process.” (NAP, 2016, p. 34) 
“We will have to monitor that, and to see how consistent or 
inconsistent it is [...] between years, between disciplines, 
throughout the years, [...] all that can be solved, but not all 
of those solutions are  well settled yet, for example, if you 
want to observe value-added for a longer perspective [...]not 
just looking at lots of two but bigger blocks, it is not 
obvious how [...] the missing set is amplified, and you need 
more assumptions for the statistical models, becoming very 





 “The problem of establishing value-added methodologies at 
census level is that there is too much mobility of schools in 
Chile. [...] 30% of the students move from one school to 
another [...] because from one year to another you have 30% 
of mobility, you have to do value-added in one year, and 





“Now the problem with value-added indicators is that they 
require a greater number of tests. And one of the big issues 
we have faced is that we see that schools are too overloaded 
with externalized assessment, generating some tension 
within them. And to generate tension within schools 
through policy is not good, because it prevents public policy 
from working as it wants to work. Thus, in fact, one of the 
things that this administration did was to rationalize the 
number of tests [...] we went from 18 to 9, that is, we cut the 





 “With the evaluations plan established last year, we have 
given up to have any type of value-added […] there is less 








 “For example, you could follow a student from year two, to 
year four, to year eight in primary, and to year ten in 
secondary. You wouldn't have SIMCE for all those years, 
but you could have it at least for year four and eight. But 
these levels have a four year difference, and this is too 
much. In general, one should have one every two years or 




“If you opened the value-added box, you wouldn't get it (the 
new school classification for accountability purposes) 
because you had to give it much more thought, you had to 
try, you had to pilot, you had new instruments, you had to 
see if it made any sense, you had to check the stability of 
the indicators […] it was an impossible deadline, and a 
technical standard that looked too difficult” (Former 
policymaker ACE) 
“Implementation was too quick (the new methodology), 
without going through a wider discussion and obtaining 
empirical evidence about how it would work, before 
adopting one model [...] apart from a study that lasted a 
couple of months.” (Researcher University B) 
Limited 
applicability 
“It is important to point out that, on one hand, given the 
high mobility of students between different year groups in 
the Chilean educational system and the huge proportion of 
small schools in year four, it is not possible to generate 
progress or value-added measure for all Chilean schools, 
limiting its applicability for accountability at the school 
level.” (NAP, p. 34) 
Expensive “Implies increasing the amount of years [...] the cost of 
doing this is too high […] too costly for an administration 
that needs to take charge of each and every school. Thus, it 
is very difficult in practice [...] it is too difficult to 
implement […] I think the main problem is that you have to 
increase the number of tests. And that implies resources.” 
(Policymaker QAE) 
 
In terms of the (1) Political reasons, participants argued that VAM were value-laden concepts, 
associated with test-based accountability, that tend to align better with right-wing governments 
educational reforms. They also mentioned the lack of political vision of previous administrations, 
as the development of value-added indicators takes longer than the 4 years period in which 
government is in power. It was highlighted that the current focus of the government was to 
promote collaboration instead than competition between schools, which was identified as a by-
product of VAM. Policy makers argued that they had encountered such research opposition 
 
 
against the current system, that thinking in a more complex one was beyond their possibilities. 
They also mentioned that VAM promoted a narrow focus on academic outcomes, something that 
was identified as a big limitation of the new accountability system. In this sense policymakers 
were more interested in evaluating new no-academic outcomes (such as self-esteem), rather than 
bringing more complexity into the way academic outcomes were assessed. In terms of (2) 
Methodological reasons against VAM, the lack of experts in the country was limiting its 
implementation, as well as the lack of vertical equating in SIMCE tests, and the debatable nature 
of the value-added indicator. Also the biased sample, resulting from the presence of many small 
schools in which the value-added indicator cannot be estimated, was perceived as a limitation: 
“Those schools for which it is plausible to estimate progress and value-added indicators are 
characterized by particular conditions, for example, high enrolment, high student retention, they 
are predominantly fully private or state-subsidized private [...] they represent a biased sample of 
the schools' population, limiting the external validity of the estimations carried out for 
monitoring the educational system.” (NAP, 2016, p. 34). Another methodological limitation was 
the low consistency that the value-added indicator reach when estimated with different 
methodologies and control variables, and the high mobility of students. As stated by a 
policymaker:  “The problem of establishing value-added methodologies at census level is that 
there is too much student mobility between schools in Chile. [...] 30% of the students move from 
one school to another [...] because from one year to another you have 30% of mobility, you have 
to do value-added in one year, and that is almost impossible." (Policymaker QAE). Focusing on 
(3) Pragmatic reasons, participants mentioned that schools were already overloaded with external 
standardised assessments, so the limited longitudinal data was a real problem, just as the long 
periods between assessments (i.e. 4 years) that characterise the national assessment system. 
Another pragmatic issue was the limited applicability of the indicator, as for example its 
problematic application in rural small schools. Finally, the development of new tests on which to 
base VAM was perceived as too long and expensive, especially given the fact that VAM was out 
of the policy priorities currently under implementation.  
 
Discussion 
This small-scale study explored qualitatively the policy context in which VAM have been 
omitted from the Chilean educational landscape, by analyzing policy documents and 
 
interviewing local policymakers and researchers about their views. Firstly, although participants 
and official documents point to political, methodological and pragmatic reasons for and against 
value-added indicators, they only highlighted ethical and legal reasons pro (but not against) 
VAM. Aligning the ethical dimension with Lakoff (2002), who argued that “it is the work of the 
government to “level the playing field” for the disadvantaged” (p. 180), at a time of growing 
pressure and associated vulnerability derived from the introduction of high-stakes consequences 
on schools -particularly those classified as ‘insufficient’’- there is local awareness that VAM 
could level the playing field particularly for those schools that are not showing high standards on 
attainment, to be rightly recognized for the value they are adding to their pupils’ progress. By 
providing performance indicators that do not measure students’ relative progress over time, QAE 
will continue conveying the unsubstantiated messages (i.e. school type explains student 
performance, public schools are inefficient), contributing to the vulnerability of public schools 
that may not be in a position to demonstrate, due to influential but unmeasured factors outside 
their control, high standards on raw scores, as well as supporting undesirable consequences, such 
as school selectivity, segregation, unfair competition and low school morale in more 
disadvantage contexts. Concerning the legal dimension, although incorporating VAM into the 
new school accountability system is prescribed by law, neither policymakers nor researchers 
perceive it as urgent or imperative. Rather they understand it as a possibility, among others, for 
improving the system. 
Secondly, despite participants and policy documents provided a more restricted set of reasons 
against VAM, many political, methodological and pragmatic barriers to including them into the 
new accountability system were identified. Although some of the difficulties claimed (i.e high 
mobility of students and small schools) are common to any attempt of using statistical models to 
measure school effectiveness, they also affect VAM and need to be carefully considered before 
implementing these models in the Chilean educational system. However, some of the perceived 
limitations are open to discussion. For example, the idea that it is unadvisable to track students 
for long periods of time is not supported by previous research. The Chicago Public school test-
based accountability system is well-known for tracking students’ outcomes up to four years 
(Jacob, 2005). Indeed, longer time periods between prior and outcome attainment are likely to 
result in more variation in student attainment and more robust VAM. 
 
 
Without dismissing the challenges identified in this study, and in line with Murphy (2012), we 
are not arguing for value-added as the only indicators to be considered when implementing high-
stakes decisions. Rather, along with Carrasco and San Martín (2012) and Saunders and Budd 
(1999), we advocate for the need to include these indicators among others, in order to construct 
“a truer picture of a school’s achievements, and for diagnosing pedagogical strengths and 
weaknesses within the school” (p. 9), which are the expected effects that these measures can 
bring if they were eventually included in the Chilean school accountability system.  
We believe that the debate around VAM for school performance should move in two directions. 
The first one is to critically review the local research into longitudinal value-added indicators 
that has been conducted using Chilean performance data over the last decade. Our previous work 
-along with the research conducted by leading researchers who have explored various models 
and indicators of value-added using SIMCE data- will provide a clearer picture of the 
possibilities and challenges that need to be resolved before moving from research to policy. 
Although there is no consensus regarding the VAM that should be specifically adopted to 
account for the Chilean case, critical engagement with the available evidence could enhance the 
role that value-added can play in a fairer assessment of the effectiveness of Chilean schools. 
Secondly, as the methodological and pragmatic challenges could be resolved, the most critical 
one seem political. Whilst the previous administration chose a methodology for classifying 
schools that appeared more efficient and avoided using multi-level modelling because it was 
perceived as being against their overall policy agenda (i.e. implement a high-stake accountability 
system rather than develop a fair system), the current government shifted away from value-added 
indicators as a way of prioritizing a more supportive role of QAE, away from testing and 
competition. Because without political will it is unlikely that VAM will be implemented in the 
Chilean context, and given that the political reasons were not just used to justify the decision of 
excluding them from the national policy, but also the need to be “cautious” when approaching 
studies taking this approach (Decree 182, p. 13), it is clear that the policy discussion is heavily 
loaded against these indicators: they are seen as potentially detrimental to the accountability 
system currently in place, based on contextualized attainment models and other indicators of 
school quality. Bearing in mind that the creation of high-quality frameworks for assessing value-
added indicators takes time, needs support (Gray & Wilcox, 1995; Sounders, 1997), and needs to 
 
consider limitations and potential unintended consequences (Goldstein & Spiegelhalter,1996; 
Gorard, 2006, 2008, 2010; Hursh, 2013, Koretz, 2017), the road towards including them into the 
Chilean school accountability system is just starting. Moving from being a research tool to an 
instrument for judging school quality will require accessible examples of how these indicators 
can be used at the national and school level to monitor students’ progress, alongside other types 
of evaluation evidence, and support school improvement efforts. Until then, value-added 
indicators will keep being omitted from the Chilean school accountability system. 
 
Finally, bearing in mind that this is a small-scale qualitative study, it is important to highlight the 
limitations derived from its methodology. The study does not have an explanatory status and it is 
not representative of a larger population. The limitations derived from working with an 
opportunistic sample are well known. However, its descriptive nature has given us a window to 
identify the main strengths and limitations articulated by key policy documents, policymakers 
and researchers around VAM in the Chilean context, which in turn helps to clarify and 
understand the key issues that need to be addressed before seeing this type of indicator being 
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